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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Pensacola Division 
 
Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through 
PAM BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA; 
 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, by and through 
ALAN WILSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; 
 
STATE OF NEBRASKA, by and through 
JON BRUNING, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA; 
 
STATE OF TEXAS, by and through 
GREG ABBOTT, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS; 
 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
 
STATE OF LOUISIANA, by and through 
JAMES D. “BUDDY” CALDWELL, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; 
 
STATE OF ALABAMA, by and through 
LUTHER STRANGE, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA; 
 
BILL SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, ON BEHALF OF  
THE PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN; 
 
STATE OF COLORADO, by and through 
JOHN W. SUTHERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF COLORADO; 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, by 
and through THOMAS W. CORBETT, Jr.,  
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GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF PENNSYLVANIA, and WILLIAM H. RYAN, 
Jr., ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
 
STATE OF WASHINGTON, by and through 
ROBERT M. McKENNA, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON; 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, by and through 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, by and through 
MARTY J. JACKLEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA; 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, by and through  
GREGORY F. ZOELLER, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF INDIANA; 
 
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, by and through  
WAYNE STENEHJEM, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA; 
 
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, by and through 
HALEY BARBOUR, GOVERNOR OF 
THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; 
 
STATE OF ARIZONA, by and through JANICE K. 
BREWER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 
and THOMAS C. HORNE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE STATE OF ARIZONA; 
 
STATE OF NEVADA, by and through JIM GIBBONS, 
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEVADA; 
 
STATE OF GEORGIA, by and through SAMUEL S. OLENS, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA; 
 
STATE OF ALASKA, by and through 
DANIEL S. SULLIVAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE STATE OF ALASKA; 
 
Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV  -EMT   Document 147    Filed 01/18/11   Page 2 of 12
3 
 
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT 
BUSINESS, a California nonprofit mutual benefit 
corporation; 
 
MARY BROWN, an individual; and 
 






UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official 
capacity as the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services; 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY; TIMOTHY F. 
GEITHNER, in his official capacity as the 
Secretary of the United States Department 
of the Treasury; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and HILDA 
L. SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary 





PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT JOINING ADDITIONAL PLAINTIFF STATES AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
 
Pursuant to Rules 15, 20, and 21, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs 
hereby move for leave to file their Second Amended Complaint,1 submitted 
                                                 
1 The caption of this motion (and that of the Second Amended Complaint) reflects 
changes in the identities of various public officers by and through whom this action is 
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff States.  Substitution of public officers is automatic 
under Rule 25(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
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contemporaneously herewith, for the sole purpose of adding the following States as 
Plaintiffs: 
STATE OF OHIO, by and through MICHAEL DeWINE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OHIO; 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, by and through DEREK SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF KANSAS; 
 
STATE OF WYOMING, by and through MATTHEW H. MEAD, 
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF WYOMING; 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN, by and through J.B. VAN HOLLEN, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN; 
 
STATE OF MAINE, by and through WILLIAM J. SCHNEIDER, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MAINE; and 
 
TERRY E. BRANSTAD, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF IOWA, ON 
BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF IOWA. 
 
As shown below, the inclusion and participation of these six States (the 
“Additional States”) as Plaintiffs, following the recent cycle of elections nationally, is 
entirely proper, because the Additional States share the same interests, assert the same 
claims, and seek the same relief as the Plaintiff States in this litigation with respect to the 
same Act of Congress.2  The Additional States have authorized the undersigned to advise 
the Court that they support this motion. 
Moreover, joinder of the Additional States and the filing of the Second Amended 
Complaint to reflect that joinder will neither delay this action nor prejudice Defendants.  
The Additional States accept this action as it now stands, with the parties’ cross-motions 
                                                 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (collectively the “ACA” or the “Act”). 
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for summary judgment having been fully briefed and argued before the Court.  Indeed, 
the only change made by the Second Amended Complaint is the identification of the 
Additional States as named Plaintiffs; even the paragraph numbers as between the 
Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint remain the same.3  
Consequently, Defendants’ Answer, which under Rule 15(a)(3) would be due 14 days 
after filing of the Second Amended Complaint is deemed effective, will require virtually 
no modification.4 
Beyond these simple matters of form, the only effect of granting this motion 
would be to expand from 20 to 26 the number of Plaintiff States joining together to seek 
both a declaration that the ACA is unconstitutional and injunctive relief for the benefit of 
themselves and their citizens and residents.  Thus, the requested relief will not result in 
any detriment to Defendants in defending this action; and the Additional States, after 
being permitted to be named as Plaintiffs, will be in a position to benefit from any 
equitable remedies that may be entered in this cause.5 
                                                 
3  Counts Two, Three, Five, and Six of the Amended Complaint were dismissed by the 
Court, per its Order and Memorandum Opinion dated October 14, 2010 [Doc. 79].  Those 
counts are realleged in the Second Amended Complaint in order to preserve them and 
avoid abandonment of them.  (N.D. Fla. Local Rule 15.1 provides that “[m]atters not set 
forth in the amended pleading are deemed to have been abandoned.”) 
4  In fact, only a single paragraph of the “Answer to Amended Complaint” [Doc. 81] – in 
which Defendants collectively respond to paragraphs 6-25 of the Amended Complaint – 
would need to be altered, for the limited purpose of admitting that the six Additional 
States are States. 
5 As acknowledged in the Certificate of Conference with Opposing Parties, infra, 
Defendants have indicated that they oppose this motion on the stated basis that it is 
inconsistent with this Court’s Orders of April 14 and 23, 2010.  Significantly, Defendants 
have not claimed that they would be prejudiced – the most important consideration under 
settled law, as demonstrated below.  While the Court’s April 14 Order did establish a 
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Memorandum in Support 
Rule 20(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows parties to join together as 
plaintiffs in the same action if  
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the 
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and 
occurrences; and 
 
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will 
arise in the action. 
 
Cf. Moore v. Comfed Savings Bank, 908 F.2d 834 (11th Cir. 1990) (joinder of all 
defendants held proper under Rule 20 because “all of these transactions arose out of a 
series of transactions or occurrences initiated by Land Bank and all of the claims 
involved the same question of law and fact.”).  
The proper procedure for a party to add plaintiffs is to seek leave to amend the 
complaint.  4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 20.02[a][ii] (3d ed. 
2009). 
                                                                                                                                                 
May 14 deadline for joining parties, that deadline was set in the context of fixing a date 
for filing the Amended Complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(A), 
Defendants having filed no responsive pleading as of that time.  Plaintiffs do not believe 
that the Court intended the May 14 deadline to bar all later requests for leave to add 
parties under Rule 15(a)(2).  Plaintiffs’ belief is implicitly supported by the Court’s April 
23 Order, which denied intervention by various outside parties under Rule 24, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  There, the Court noted its concern that allowing intervenors 
with distinct claims could prevent resolution of this case “in an efficient and timely 
manner.”  [Doc. 37 at 2.]  But the Court did not set a deadline for filing of motions to 
intervene.  That the Additional Plaintiffs – who will not be introducing any collateral 
issues – could have sought to join this action through permissive intervention under Rule 
24 underscores the appropriateness of their inclusion through amendment of the pleading 
pursuant to Rule 15.  
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Rule 15(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing amended and 
supplemental pleadings, provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend a 
pleading] when justice so requires.”6 
In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), the Supreme Court set forth the standard 
to be applied in determining whether leave to amend a complaint should be granted, 
stating: 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason – such as undue 
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. – the 
leave sought should, as this rule requires, be “freely given.” 
 
 Id. at 182.  See also Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1161-62 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Foman v. Davis); Nat’l Indep. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Charter Fin. Group, 
747 F.2d 1396, 1404 (11th Cir. 1984) (same). 
 Of the pertinent factors identified by the courts, prejudice to the opposing party is 
the most important to consider in determining whether leave to amend should be granted: 
However, unlike amendments as of course, amendments under 
Rule 15(a)(2) may be made at any stage of the litigation.  The only 
prerequisites are that the district court have jurisdiction over the 
case and an appeal must not be pending.  If these two conditions 
are met, the court will proceed to examine the effect and the timing 
of the proposed amendments to determine whether they would 
prejudice the rights of any of the other parties to the suit.  If no 
prejudice is found, then leave normally will be granted. 
 
6 C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1484 (2010).  
                                                 
6  Similarly, Rule 21, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, “[o]n motion or on 
its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” 
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 There is no prescribed “time limit within which a party may apply to the court for 
leave to amend.”  Id. at § 1488.  Indeed: 
[t]he courts have not imposed any arbitrary timing restrictions on 
requests for leave to amend and permission has been granted under 
Rule 15(a) at various stages of the litigation.  These include: 
following discovery; after a pretrial conference; at a hearing on a 
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment; when the case is on 
the trial calendar and has been set for a hearing by the district 
court; at the beginning, during, and at the close of trial; after a 
judgment has been entered; and even on remand following an 
appeal. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 In the case at bar, the criteria for joinder under Rule 20(a) plainly are met.  
Plaintiff States, through the various causes of action set forth in their pleading, have 
raised facial constitutional challenges to the ACA, and the Additional States seek to 
assert exactly the same claims.  Thus, the legal issues at stake are common to the Plaintiff 
States and the Additional States.  Further, the parties agree, by their cross-motions for 
summary judgment, that there are no genuine issues of material fact – and no discovery 
has been undertaken by any party. 
Moreover, none of the recognized factors that might weigh against allowing a 
requested amendment has any applicability here.  Most importantly, no prejudice to 
Defendants would arise from allowing joinder of the Additional States.  The Additional 
States accept the case as it is, with the summary judgment cross-motions having been 
fully briefed and argued.  No new claims or defenses would arise from the filing of the 
Second Amended Complaint; no delay in the resolution of the summary judgment 
motions would result; and, apart from the minimal task of altering their Answer (as noted 
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above), Defendants will not be put to any additional burden or expense.  Nor has there 
been any undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure 
deficiencies by previous amendment.7 
On the issues of timeliness, prejudice, and futility of amendment, United States v. 
Oregon, 745 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984), is instructive.  There, the appellate court, reversing 
the district court, allowed Idaho to intervene under Rule 24, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The Court stated: 
The key point in this appeal, however, is that the existing 
parties’ concerns have little to do with timeliness.  They do not 
suggest that their problems are materially different now than they 
would have been had Idaho sought to intervene a decade or more 
ago.  We find no basis in the record for holding that the 
intervention would prejudice the existing parties because of the 
passage of time. … There is no serious dispute that Idaho has 
interests which may be affected by the disposition of this litigation. 
… As a party to the action, it will be able to invoke the district 
court’s jurisdiction to secure adherence to orders of the district 
court. 
 Id. at 553. 
Likewise, in the instant action, the inclusion of the Additional States as parties has 
“little to do with timeliness” and, as noted, would result in no prejudice to Defendants.  
Moreover, the requested amendment would not be a futile act, because the Additional 
States, like Plaintiff States, have a legitimate desire to obtain injunctive relief in order to 
                                                 
7  In sharp contrast, in National Independent Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Charter 
Financial Group, “Charter and Columbia, both ready for trial, would have been 
prejudiced by the delay and expense occasioned by the largely repetitious discovery the 
new defendants would have required[,]” and amendment would have been futile.  747 
F.2d at 1404.  Similarly, in Campbell v. Emory Clinic, “[a]mendment at the late date 
offered would have been futile, caused undue delay and expense, and resulted in unfair 
prejudice to the individual defendants.”  166 F.3d at 1162.  
Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV  -EMT   Document 147    Filed 01/18/11   Page 9 of 12
10 
 
protect themselves, their citizens, and their residents from enforcement of the ACA by 
the Defendants, and seek to “invoke the District Court’s jurisdiction to secure adherence 
to orders of the District Court.”  
Conclusion 
 For all the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs ask that their motion be granted and 
that their Second Amended Complaint be deemed effectively filed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
   PAMELA JO BONDI 
   ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA 
 
      /s/ Blaine H. Winship 
      Blaine H. Winship (Fla. Bar No. 0356913) 
      Special Counsel 
      Joseph W. Jacquot (Fla. Bar No. 189715) 
      Special Counsel 
      Scott D. Makar (Fla. Bar No. 709697) 
      Solicitor General 
      Louis F. Hubener (Fla. Bar No. 0140084) 
      Timothy D. Osterhaus (Fla. Bar No. 
0133728) 
      Deputy Solicitors General 
      Office of the Attorney General of Florida 
      The Capitol, Suite PL-01 
      Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 
      Telephone: (850) 414-3300 
      Facsimile: (850) 488-4872 
      Email: blaine.winship@myfloridalegal.com 
      Attorneys for Plaintiff States 
 
Karen R. Harned    David B. Rivkin (D.C. Bar No. 394446) 
Executive Director    Lee A. Casey (D.C. Bar No. 447443) 
National Federation of Independent  Baker & Hostetler LLP 
Business     1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Ste. 1100 
Small Business Legal Center   Washington, DC 20036 
1201 F Street, N.W., Suite 200  Telephone: (202) 861-1731 
Washington, DC 20004   Facsimile: (202) 861-1783 
Telephone: (202) 314-2061   Attorneys for Plaintiff States, National 
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Facsimile: (202) 554-5572   Federation of Independent Business, Mary 
Of counsel for Plaintiff National  Brown, and Kaj Ahlburg 
Federation of Independent Business 
      Katherine J. Spohn 
      Special Counsel to the Attorney General 
      Office of the Attorney General of Nebraska 
      2115 State Capitol Building 
      Lincoln, Nebraska 68508 
      Telephone: (402) 471-2834 
      Facsimile: (402) 471-1929 
      Email: katie.spohn@nebraska.gov 
      Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Nebraska 
 
      Bill Cobb 
      Deputy Attorney General 
      for Civil Litigation 
      Office of the Attorney General of Texas 
      P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station 
      Austin, Texas 78711-2548 
      Telephone: (512) 475-0131 
      Facsimile: (512) 936-0545 
      Email: bill.cobb@oag.state.tx.us 




CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING PARTIES 
 
 Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(B) of the Northern District of Florida, the undersigned 
counsel hereby certifies that he conferred with counsel for Defendants in a good faith 
effort to resolve by agreement the issues raised in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File 
Second Amended Complaint Joining Additional Plaintiff States, but that he was 
unsuccessful in reaching agreement.  Defendants’ counsel indicated that they believe 
Plaintiffs’ Motion to be inconsistent with the Court’s Order of April 23, 2010, denying 
motions to intervene; and that adding new parties now is, among other things, 
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inconsistent with the Court’s Order of April 14, 2010, permitting amendment by May 14, 
2010. 
      /s/ Blaine H. Winship 
      Blaine H. Winship 
      Special Counsel 
      Office of the Attorney General of Florida 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that, on this 18th day of January, 2011, a copy of the foregoing 
motion was served on counsel of record for all Defendants through the Court’s Notice of 
Electronic Filing system. 
 
      /s/ Blaine H. Winship 
      Blaine H. Winship 
      Special Counsel 
      Office of the Attorney General of Florida 
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